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INTRODUCTION: COLLABORATION GOOD
OR BAD: HOW IS IT WORKING ON
THE COLORADO RIVER?
Jean R. Sternlight*
Collaboration has two meanings. These days we mostly think of the
“good” meaning: working together, cooperatively, to accomplish a goal. But,
when persons were described as “collaborators” in the World War II era, the
term was not meant as a compliment but rather as a pejorative.1 In recent
years, collaboration has come to be fashionable as a means to resolve public
disputes such as those pertaining to environmental issues and natural resources.
Such collaboration may include work groups, stakeholder input, market-based
solutions, and negotiated rulemaking. Yet, paralleling the difference between
the two definitions of collaboration, similarly the success of these collaborative
approaches is contested. Some sing the praises of collaboration—a peaceful,
non-litigious means of resolving disputes that can be quicker, better, and more
effective than alternative approaches such as litigation or top-down orders. Yet
others fear that collaboration serves a negative purpose—allowing powerful
parties to impose their will on weaker parties and to avoid legal strictures. In
the environmental context, specifically, some express the fear that collaborative
approaches may not adequately protect the environment or the interests of less
powerful groups, and urge that the clout and precedent of the public lawmaking
processes and courtroom are often needed to achieve the best results.
The Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution decided to host a conference,
in the fall of 2007, to focus on the uses of collaboration to resolve environmental and natural resource disputes pertaining to the Colorado River. This issue is
very personal to us here in the West, and particularly in Las Vegas. Residing in
a desert we spend a great deal of time thinking and talking about water, and the
lack thereof. Driving past Lake Mead, the ever-shrinking reservoir holding
Colorado River water restrained by the Hoover Dam, we invariably notice the
white rings on the side marking higher water days of not too long ago. Drought
has enhanced conflicts that already existed as to which jurisdictions and which
categories of users should have higher priority claims to the limited water
resource. Nor is consumption and use of water the only environmental or natural resource dispute spawned by the Colorado River. Conflicts also exist as to
* Michael & Sonja Saltman Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas & Director
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution. I thank Michael and Sonja Saltman, the staff of the
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, and the Boyd School of Law for making this
conference possible. I thank Professor Bret Birdsong for helping in the planning and
organization of the event.
1 See Collaborationism – Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborationism (last
visited May 18, 2008) (explaining that collaboration may refer to cooperating with an enemy
occupying one’s country or to cooperating with evil forces such as Nazis more broadly).
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what are the most appropriate recreational, agricultural, and residential uses of
surrounding lands, and what steps need to be taken to protect animals and
plants that inhabit the region.
As conference organizers we were highly aware that significant differences of opinion exist regarding the extent to which collaborative approaches
are an effective means of resolving the sorts of environmental disputes that
surround an important natural resource such as the Colorado River. We knew
that environmentalists and professors of environmental law are often skeptical
of the collaborative approach, and that dispute resolution professionals and academics are typically more enthusiastic about collaboration. Our goal, in hosting the conference, was not to reach a final resolution to this debate but rather
to get beyond simplistic rhetoric and instead foster a sophisticated conversation
in which persons on all sides of these issues could share their views. We
thought that by focusing on a particular set of environmental disputes, those
involving the Colorado River, we would ensure that the speakers addressed
themselves to specifics, rather than talking in more general terms.
The one-day conference that took place on October 12, 2007, certainly
met our goals.2 Although speakers and attendees may not have left with a
shared viewpoint, we are confident that all left with a more nuanced understanding of both the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches to
collaboration. The conference was a success due to the extremely high quality
of all of our speakers, and due to those speakers’ willingness to listen to and
learn from one another.
This written version of the conference now builds upon the live event. We
are most fortunate that many (unfortunately not all) of the speakers were able to
contribute articles to comprise this written version of the Symposium. In their
papers, presenters have expanded on their oral remarks and responded to points
made by others during the conference. Like the live Symposium, this written
Symposium is organized around several major themes.
In the first session Professor Bradley Karkkainen, an expert in environmental and natural resource law, presented a paper entitled Getting to “Let’s
Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration.3 Drawing on the theoretical work of Charles Sabel and William
Simon,4 asserting that “public law litigation is moving away from the model of
‘command-and-control’ style judicial intervention, toward what they call a
‘destabilization rights’ approach,” Karkkainen focuses on the extent to which
judges have increasingly sought to “blow the whistle” on statutory or constitutional violations, thereby “pull[ing] the plug on”—or “destabilizing”—an
offending institution, but then effectively remanding the precise design of a
solution to administrative bodies.5 Professor Karkkainen urges, however, that
litigation is not the only event that can trigger destabilization of existing rights
2 The full program for this event is available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/pdf/Colorado_Conference.pdf.
3 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations and
the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811 (2008).
4 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
5 Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 811.

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ301.txt

Spring 2008]

unknown

INTRODUCTION

Seq: 3

8-AUG-08

10:56

805

and institutions, pointing out that natural and human actions can also cause
such shifts. He predicts that the coming drought-generated destabilization on
the Colorado “will provoke fierce and sometimes cutthroat competition, but
also a new round of collaboration.”6
One respondent to Professor Karkkainen was Dr. Kirk Emerson, Director
of the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution.7 She notes that
while, as a practitioner of environmental conflict resolution, she finds that
Karkkainen’s analysis generally “rings true,”8 she also sees that destabilization
of established rights could lead to less rather than more collaboration.9 She
suggests that collaboration is often made possible because of the existence of
legal certainty, and inspired by the recognition that results obtained through
collaboration may be superior to the results that might otherwise ensue.10 At
the same time, Emerson recognizes that collaboration alone does not necessarily deliver better solutions than other approaches to conflict resolution.11
A second commentator on Professor Karkkainen’s work was Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a renowned expert in the field of conflict resolution.12
Like Emerson, Menkel-Meadow expresses general support for Karkkainen’s
ideas but also offers some “quibbles”13 and some amplification. MenkelMeadow’s two most significant differences with Karkkainen are to emphasize
that even some of the classic public law litigation often involved substantial
collaboration,14 and that “sophisticated dispute resolution scholars” (as
opposed to dispute resolution populists) do not in fact use the phrasing “winwin” because they recognize that it is rarely possible for two or more disputants
to all improve their situation.15 As for amplification, she provides some very
useful thoughts on factors encouraging collaborative processes,16 impediments
to collaborative processes,17 challenges in the use of collaborative processes,18
and suggestions for meeting the challenges and encouraging collaborative
processes.19
The second session was headed by Professor Bret Birdsong, a recognized
authority in natural resource law, who presented a talk alliteratively entitled
Séances, Ciénegas,20 and Slop: Can Collaboration Save the Delta? 21 Focus6

Id. at 812.
Kirk Emerson, On Perfect Storms and Sacred Cows of Collaboration: Comments On
Bradley Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations and the
Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 830 (2008).
8 Id. at 830.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 831.
11 Id. at 832.
12 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on Collaborative Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835 (2008).
13 Id. at 837.
14 Id. at 837-38.
15 Id. at 839.
16 Id. at 840-45.
17 Id. at 845-46.
18 Id. at 846-48.
19 Id. at 848-52.
20 A “ciénega” is a swamp. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 58
(1998).
7
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ing on the Colorado River Delta, located in Mexico, Birdsong explains that
water allocation decisions made upstream in the United States have severely
contributed to the decline of the delta, thereby harming both environmental and
farming interests related to the delta. While Birdsong sees collaboration as
essential and inevitable, as means to allocate the river water,22 he also urges
that “[c]ollaboration alone, without structuring the legal and economic framework for policymaking to provide specifically for the goal of protecting the
delta, is unlikely to move much water downstream to where it’s needed to save
the imperiled delta.”23 He fears, specifically, that the more powerful interests
in the United States will be able to collaborate with one another to continue to
deprive Mexico and the delta of much-needed water.24 While not optimistic
regarding solutions, Birdsong urges that, at minimum, the process be
“tweaked” to allow environmental stakeholders and Mexico to play a greater
role in collaborative processes pertaining to the river.25
One respondent to Professor Birdsong’s paper was Dr. Francisco ZamoraArroyo,26 Director of the Upper Gulf of California Legacy Program at the
Sonoran Institute.27 Together with several co-authors,28 Zamora questions
aspects of Professor Birdsong’s premise, urging that “in many instances the
collaboration process has promoted the development of innovative legal and
economic frameworks to advance the conservation and sustainable development of the Delta.”29 Indeed, Zamora and his co-authors find “renewed hope”
for the delta in that “[i]nternational recognition of the Delta’s ecological and
socioeconomic importance has never been higher.”30 Thus, they explain, a
variety of governmental and non-governmental groups have recently been
working together on a variety of projects geared to help protect and restore the
delta.31 Zamora and his co-authors state that conditions of the delta, while still
problematic, have improved thanks to such collaboration.32
At lunch we were privileged to hear a keynote address given by Patricia
Mulroy, General Manager of the Southern Nevada Water Authority.33 One of
the best-known and respected governmental leaders in the field of water use,
Mulroy shared her unique perspectives on some of the serious water issues
facing Las Vegas and the American Southwest more generally. She focused, in
particular, on the Department of the Interior’s approval of guidelines governing
21

Bret C. Birdsong, Séances, Ciénegas, and Slop: Can Collaboration Save the Delta?, 8
NEV. L.J. 853 (2008).
22 Id. at 853.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 867.
25 Id. at 868.
26 Francisco Zamora-Arroyo et al., Collaboration in Mexico: Renewed Hope for the Colorado River Delta, 8 NEV. L.J. 871 (2008).
27 The Sonoran Institute describes its mission as “to inspire and enable community decisions
and public policies that respect the land and people of western North America.” Sonoran
Institute, http://www.sonoran.org (follow “About Us” hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2008).
28 The co-authors are Osvel Hinojosa-Huerta, Edith Santiago, Emily Brott, and Peter Culp.
29 Zamora-Arroyo et al., supra note 26, at 872.
30 Id. at 871.
31 Id. at 872.
32 Id.
33 Patricia Mulroy, Collaboration and the Colorado River Compact, 8 NEV. L.J. 890 (2008).
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allocation of water shortages on the Colorado River.34 She explained that the
guidelines were the product of decades-long interaction and collaboration
between the seven basin states all bordering on the Colorado River.35 While
recognizing that the history of the Colorado River has at times been “tortuous,”36 involving court cases as well as negotiations and agreements,37 Mulroy
is largely sanguine about the seven states’ ability to work together on solving
their problems:
By embracing the need for cooperation and partnership . . ., balancing our competing
needs and demands, and reaching out to share our experiences and solutions with
others who are facing similar challenges, the seven basin states are setting new standards for resource management that will see our communities—and the Colorado
River—through events such as the drought and climate change well into the future.38

Our first afternoon session was led by Professor Joseph Feller, an environmental law scholar and activist, who spoke on Collaborative Management of
Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of Social Engineering over Law.39 By far
the most negative of all the speakers with respect to collaboration, Professor
Feller urges that the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program has
improperly substituted collaborative decisionmaking for the hierarchy of priorities created by law, thereby facilitating non-compliance with the Endangered
Species Act by the federal Bureau of Reclamation.40 He contends that while
“adaptive management,” a process of flexible management that adjusts to new
developments, is “consistent with the laws governing dam operations,”41 in
contrast, “[t]he program’s emphasis on seeking collaboration and consensus
among stakeholders is neither supported by existing law nor necessitated by the
concept of adaptive management.”42 Feller, therefore, concludes that while the
concept of collaboration and consensus may be attractive to many, “we must
not forget that ours is a government of laws, and that citizens have a right to
expect that agencies will respect those laws, even when they require outcomes
that displease large and powerful elements of the agencies’ constituencies.”43
In Feller’s view, neglect of the law has facilitated non-compliance with the
Endangered Species Act and caused harm to many fish and wildlife.44
Writing in response, Professor Alejandro Camacho, an expert in regulatory innovation, is far more upbeat than Professor Feller about the potential role
of collaboration in the regulation and management of natural resources,45 but
34

The guidelines were not actually signed until December 13, 2007, a few months after the
conference was held.
35 Mulroy, supra note 33, at 892.
36 Id. at 893.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 895.
39 Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of
Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896 (2008).
40 Id. at 898.
41 Id. at 939.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 898.
45 Professor Camacho notes that in prior work he has argued that “meaningful stakeholder
participation should serve a central role in the management of natural resources and the
regulation of land use and that regulatory processes should account for the uncertainty inher-
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nonetheless agrees that there are significant problems in the way in which the
Glen Canyon collaborative program in particular has been implemented.46 He
finds that in setting up the Glen Canyon Dam program Congress paid insufficient attention to key issues such as balancing competing priorities of water,
power, and the environment;47 setting transparent measurable regulatory
targets;48 monitoring and adapting the successes of the regulatory program
itself;49 and structuring the collaborative process.50 Yet, despite these flaws in
the end, Professor Camacho sees the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management
Program as a learning opportunity that can help improve future experimental
and collaborative processes, rather than an indictment of the collaborative
enterprise.51
The fourth session was led by Professor Douglas L. Grant, a renowned
water law expert, who presented a paper entitled Collaborative Solutions to
Colorado River Water Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond.52
Explaining that the river “has been gripped since 2000 by the worst drought in
over a century of recordkeeping,”53 Professor Grant focuses on how the seven
basin states dependent on that water have collaborated to try to deal with the
crisis. He relates that following a request in 2005 by the Bureau of Reclamation for public input regarding how best to deal with the alarming decline in
water levels, all seven river basin states within two years submitted a joint
proposal to deal with the shortages.54 A revised version of that proposal
became the foundation of interim guidelines issued by the Secretary of the Interior, leading Professor Grant to call the basin states’ collaboration “a remarkable achievement by parties that have not always gotten along regarding
management of the Colorado River.”55 In his paper, Grant shows why the
changes set out in the new interim guidelines will make all seven states better
ent in regulatory decisions by making such processes more adaptive.” Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon
Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 943 (2008). At the live conference, we also heard
responses from Dennis Kubly, Chief of the Adaptive Management Group who works on the
Glen Canyon Dam, and Mary Orton, who helps facilitate collaborative efforts with respect to
the Glen Canyon and elsewhere. Both Kubly and Orton were also far more upbeat than
Professor Feller about the successes of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management
program.
46 Id. at 944.
47 Id. at 949.
48 Id. at 953.
49 Id. at 955.
50 Id. at 960. For example, Camacho notes that because the Secretary of the Interior’s
Designee has the power to authorize votes by a two-thirds majority, rather than by consensus, the numerical makeup of the working group becomes critical. He wonders whether
there was a logic to having six Native American tribe representatives, for example, but only
two local environmental groups. Id. at 959.
51 Id. at 962-63.
52 Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages: The
Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964 (2008).
53 Id. at 964.
54 Id. at 964-65.
55 Id. at 965.
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off,56 and then goes on to advance additional strategies for promoting future
collaboration.57
Professor Sandra Zellmer’s response to Professor Grant’s paper focuses on
market-based means to promote collaboration with respect to water use.58 An
expert in natural resource law, Zellmer considers such approaches as water
banking and forbearance agreements,59 asking whether traditional doctrines
barring “speculation” with respect to water pose an insuperable barrier to such
market-based approaches.60 As Zellmer explains, although speculation is not
inherently evil, “the near universal distrust of concentrated power over
resources in the developing West” gave rise to a “universal prohibition against
speculation in water resources.”61 After exploring the anti-speculation doctrine
in detail, Zellmer concludes that while it does indeed “pose an obstacle to some
kinds of collaborative agreements,”62 the doctrine also serves important public
purposes.63 Fortunately, finds Zellmer, there are sufficient exceptions to the
anti-speculation doctrine to allow for many market-based collaborative agreements with respect to water use.64
The final session consisted of a presentation made by Professor Robert
Adler.65 Author of a book on restoring Colorado River ecosystems,66 Adler
explains that he has “long been a fan of collaborative processes,” has participated in several, and has written about many others.67 Yet, says Adler, such
laudable goal[s as] ‘getting along,’ or improving relationships, or avoiding litigation,
cannot be our only goal when the fate of one of the world’s great riparian and estuarine ecosystems is at stake, as well as the welfare of tens of millions of people who
rely on the river for water, power, recreation, and other purposes.68

Thus, observes Adler, at times “collaborative efforts can . . . become counterproductive if they exalt relationship building over the fundamental goal of
resolving the conflicts in some way in order to achieve an acceptable overall
future.”69 Reliance on politics or litigation can be preferable to collaboration,
asserts Adler, if the result of collaboration “is avoiding rather than resolving
core value disputes.”70 After analyzing three major attempts at collaboration
56

Id. at 979-80.
Id. at 984-92.
58 Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Collaborative
Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 994 (2008).
59 Id. at 1019-22.
60 Zellmer defines speculation as “the act of acquiring a resource for the purpose of subsequent use or resale, in hopes of profiting from future price fluctuations.” Id. at 997.
61 Id. at 998.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Robert W. Adler, An Ecosystem Perspective on Collaboration for the Colorado River, 8
NEV. L.J. 1031 (2008).
66 ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY (2007).
67 Adler, supra note 65, at 1031-32.
68 Id. at 1032.
69 Id. at 1033.
70 Id.
57
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with respect to the Colorado River, and finding them all wanting,71 Adler proposes a “third alternative,”72 which essentially requires broadening the collaborative process to include a larger geographic area, more stakeholders, and
consideration of more issues.73 That is, rather than focus exclusively on the
Colorado River, collaborators should, for example, consider potential alternative sources of water, energy, and recreation.74
Having heard all the presentations at the live conference, and read all the
written remarks that are part of this written Symposium, I am simultaneously
impressed, depressed, and inspired. I am extremely impressed not only by the
quality of the various submissions, but also by the sophistication with which
the authors approached their topics. As an organizer of the conference, I
started from the operating assumption that those speakers coming from an
environmentalist perspective would criticize collaboration, and that those
speakers coming from the world of collaboration would sing its praises. Yet, in
fact all the writers were far more nuanced in their approach. They typically
found some positives and some negatives, and tried to take the conversation to
a sophisticated level regarding when and why collaboration can be expected to
either work or fail. At the same time, I have to admit to being rather depressed
as to both the physical state of the Colorado River and its environs, and also the
nature of some of the collaborative efforts that have been attempted with
respect to the river. Many of the panelists agree that we still need to improve
our collaboration efforts substantially in order for them to be deemed fully
effective. And, on the third hand, I have to say that I nonetheless remain in the
end optimistic as to the future of such collaborative endeavors. While we
clearly have work to do, we equally clearly have made good strides and have
people such as our panelists asking the right questions and making good recommendations. We cannot stop the drought, or its dire physical consequences for
all species dependent on its abundance, but in the end I am hopeful that by
working together in a thoughtful manner we can learn to deal with these
problems effectively. I believe that if we are careful we can ensure that such
cooperative efforts reflect the best rather than the worst definition of
“collaboration.”

71

Id. at 1034-42.
By the “third alternative” he means “a third way” that is “not a combination of the other
two ways,” but rather “a different way.” Id. at 1031 (citing David Carradine in RICHARD
KEHL, BREATHING ON YOUR OWN, QUOTATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT THINKERS 198 (2001)).
73 Id. at 1043.
74 Id. at 1043-44.
72

